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2  Historical Background: 
Economic Development 
Prior to 1962 
Korea, once known as the "Hermit  Kingdom,"  has been among the fastest 
growing  economies,  attracting  the  attention  of  both  developing  and 
developed  countries.  The  outward-looking  strategy,  adopted  since  the 
establishment of  the first  five-year development plan  in  1962, has  led  the 
economy to record impressive growth rates. The economic performance has 
been cited as the most successful export-led growth among the developing 
countries.  From  1962  to  1984, the  Korean economy  grew at  an  average 
annual rate of 8.4 percent. Within that time, Korea was transformed from a 
largely  agricultural,  subsistence economy  to  a  newly  industrialized  one, 
despite  initially  low  levels  of  domestic  savings  and  a  lack  of  natural 
resources. 
This chapter briefly describes the sociocultural development, the political 
history, and the economic factors that brought about the rapid growth in the 
1960s.' We  divide the  period  prior to  the  initiation of  the  first  five-yew 
economic plan into three subperiods: (1) the colonial period, ending in 1945; 
(2) the post-liberation and Korean War period from 1945 to 1953; and (3) the 
construction period after the war from 1954 to 1962. 
The phases of economic development cannot be completely matched with 
these subperiods. For example, severe economic dislocations prior to the end 
of  the  Korean  War  could  be  regarded  as  starting  conditions  for  later 
development. Even  the  later reconstruction process could be  viewed as a 
continuation of the economic rehabilitation program prior to the war, which 
aimed  to  overcome the  barriers  to  self-sustaining economic  growth  with 
foreign aid. However, political and social changes have a significant impact 
on the economy, so it is useful  to divide the period  according to political 
chronology. 
Unfortunately, most data in the early period are scattered, and even those 
available seem to be  inconsistent. However,  all efforts have been made to 
gather available information. 
2.1  The Colonial Period, 1910-45 
Traditionally,  China  was  a  suzerain  to  Korea  and,  not  surprisingly, 
Korea's  trade was dominated by  China.  But  as Japan began  to modernize 
after the Meiji Restoration,  it  became more  powerful and began  to exert 
more  influence  over  Korea.  In  1876  Korea  could  not  resist  the  military 
pressures from Japan to open trade and signed a trade treaty in Kang-Wha. 
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Russia,  Italy,  and  France  followed,  coming  to  Korea  and  signing  similar 
treaties on trade and commerce. 
Korea  became  a  battleground  for  many  foreign  powers  during  the  late 
nineteenth  century, but Japan’s decisive victories in the Sino-Japanese War 
(1884-85)  and  Russo-Japanese  War  (1904-5)  enabled  Japan  to ward  off 
other  foreign  powers.  Japan’s  dominance  over  Korea  intensified  and 
eventually,  in  1910, Japan officially annexed Korea. 
During the colonial period,  1910-45,  the colonial government introduced 
many new social and economic institutions and built agricultural and social 
infrastructure.  Also,  a  large  number  of  Koreans  gained  experience  in 
factories and received education at modem schools.  As a result,  Korea was 
able to post high rates of growth in both agricultural and industrial sectors by 
the  standards  of  that  time.  In  addition,  colonial  forces  improved  the 
industrial  structure  by  increasing  the  share of  manufacturing  and  mining 
sectors from a mere 4.1 percent  in  1910-20  to 26.4 percent in  1938-40. 
But this structural change had been catalyzed by Japan’s desire to utilize 
Korea as its logistical base. In a real sense, the period can be labelled as the 
industrialization of Korea for Japan. The Korean economy was distorted into 
becoming  an  adjunct  to  Japan,  controlled  by  the  totalitarian  rule  of  the 
colonial  government.  The pattern  of  trade  was  typified  by  the  export of 
primary  goods  such  as rice  and  mineral  ores to  Japan  and  the  import  of 
finished manufactured goods from Japan. Also, the industrialization process 
in  colonial  times  prevented  indigenous  development  of  an  entrepreneurial 
class and hindered the emergence of  technical and skilled manpower among 
the  Koreans.  The ownership  of  physical  capital  was  also  heavily  concen- 
trated among the Japanese. 
2.2  Post-Liberation Development and the Korean War,  1945-53 
Japan’s  direct influence  over Korea ended with  the  Second World War. 
The liberation  on  15 August  1945 divided Korea into two regions,  and the 
U.S. Army Military  Government  in Korea (USAMGIK)  was established to 
control the political  and  social turmoil and  support the transition of  South 
Korea (henceforth, Korea)  into an  independent  republic.  However,  severe 
dislocations  were  associated  both  with  the  departure of  the  Japanese  and 
with  the partition of  the peninsula.  The resources of  the two regions  were 
almost  completely  complementary,  with  most  of  the  mineral  ores  and 
hydraulic power  resources  concentrated  in  the  North, and  the  agricultural 
resources  predominant  in  the  South.  The  South  was  deprived  of  its 
traditional  sources of intermediate and capital goods. 
USAMGIK  implemented  measures  to  revitalize  the  economy  which 
suffered  from  a  drastic  decline  in  domestic  production,  severe  food 
shortages,  rapid  population  increase  owing  to  an  influx  of  refugees, 161  KoredChapter 2 
primarily  from North Korea, and rampant inflation.  Some of the measures, 
particularly  redistribution  of  Japanese-owned  land  and  modern  education 
programs,  laid  the  foundation  for  further  economic  development. 
USAMGIK  also  initiated  the  first  foreign  trade  regulations  to  eliminate 
smuggling and attempted to control inflation by rationing essential goods and 
directly  suppressing  their  prices.  These economic  rehabilitation  programs 
were implemented with massive foreign aid as discussed below. 
According to the preset political schedule, the first Republic of  Korea was 
established on  15 August  1948, replacing  USAMGIK.  Its  immediate tasks 
were to reorganize the governmental administration and reduce social unrest 
and economic instability  following the governmental  change. For the most 
part it adopted USAMGIK’s economic policies,  in particular by continuing 
the land reform, managing the grain supply, and organizing trade and foreign 
exchange policies.  There were times,  however, when the U.S. and Korean 
governments had conflicting opinions about the appropriate forms of foreign 
assistance, exchange rate management,  and monetary and fiscal stance. 
The abrupt outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 halted the rehabilitation of 
the economy. The war destroyed production facilities and took  the lives of 
many hundreds of thousands of military and civilian people. 
The three-year war ended in  a stalemate  in  1953, with the  same hostile 
forces facing each other. The armistice  signed between  the  Soviet and UN 
forces left Korea in total devastation and extreme poverty, bringing it back to 
the starting point of economic reconstruction. 
We  turn  next  to  documenting  economic  growth,  inflation,  the  role  of 
foreign aid, and the major institutional reforms during this period. 
2.2.1  Economic Stagnation 
Production fell far below the pre-World  War I1 level as both the liberation 
and  sudden  partition  disconnected  the  economic  links  between  North  and 
South Korea as well as between Korea and Japan. Average rice production 
for 1945-64  was 9.3 percent below that for 1940-44.  In  1948 manufactur- 
ing output was about  15 percent of the  1939 level.  As shown in table 2.1, 
the  economy  started  to  recover  slowly  during  1947-49  as  a  result  of 
increases  in industrial production and tungsten exports until production fell 
sharply  in  the  first  two  years  of  the  Korean  War.  As  the  war  gradually 
stalemated during  1952-53,  production recovered to well above the prewar 
level. Still, net commodity product for 1953 was 27 percent less than that for 
1940 in the southern region,  as shown in table 2.2. 
Table  2.3  also  shows  that  the  volume  of  commercial  and  government- 
financed  trade  flows  during  the  1946-53  period  was  almost  trivial  by 
preliberation  standards.  Adjusted  for the  sharp  rise  in  the  wholesale  price 
index, the annual trade volume prior to 1953 never exceeded 7 percent of the 
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Table 2.1  Production Indexes, 1946-53 
1946  1947  1948  1949  1950  1951  1952  1953 
Average index  100  115.1  148.8  208.8  131.8  106.2  183.6  239.6 
Source:  K. S. Kim and Roemer (1979, 29). 
Table 2.2  Net Commodity Product, 1940 and 1953 (in billions of constant 1953 won) 
I940 
Percentage 
1953  Change 
Agriculture  26.44  (70.2)  21.20  (76.8)  -  19.8 
Forestry  2.62  (6.9)  1.16  (4.2)  -55.7 
Fishery  3.38  (9.0)  0.43  (1.6)  -87.3 
Mining  0.84  (2.2)  0.53  (1.9)  -36.9 
Manufacturing  4.44  (11.7)  4.28  (15.5)  -2.7 
Total commodity product (net)  37.72  (100.0)  27.60  (100.0)  -26.8 
~~~~~~ 
Source  Kim and Roemer (1979, 35) 
Table 2.3  Merchandise Exports and Imports for South Korea, 194@-53 
(in millions of won) 
Current Prices  1947 Constant Prices 
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Source:  BOK, Economic Review 4 (1949):51, and BOK, Annual Economic Review,  1955. See also Kim and 
Roemer (1979, 31). 
Nore:  Trade volumes  for  1940 represent  one-half  of  all  Korean exports  and  imports.  The trade  data for 
1946-53  include only private  and government trade, and thus exclude financed imports,  transactions  with 
North Korea, and smuggling. 
‘Exports  and imports were  originally  valued  in won  (yen  in  1940) on the basis of  f.0.b.  export or c.i.f. 
import prices until March  1951 and thereafter on the basis of domestic market prices (tariffs, domestic taxes, 
and trade margins were subtracted from domestic prices to  estimate the price of imports). 
bImports and  exports made through  Inchon  and  Seoul customs offices  during March-June  1950 were  not 
included because of missing data due to the war. 
‘Average index for June 1950. 
dAverage index for April-December  in  F’usan 163  KoredChapter 2 
2.2.2  Foreign Aid and Foreign Exchange Regimes 
Dislocation, poverty, and extreme shortages of  many commodities made 
the  survival  of  South  Korea  as  an  independent political  entity  after  the 
liberation infeasible without massive foreign aid. The United States provided 
most of the foreign aid mainly in the form of food, clothing, medicines, fuel, 
and fertilizers to meet emergency needs and to raise rice production toward 
self-sufficiency. A small amount was spent on reconstruction works. 
Table  2.4  lists  the  foreign  aid  agencies  and  their  contributions.  The 
Government  Appropriations for  Relief  in  Occupied Areas  (GARIOA) aid 
program started early in the USAMGIK period, and it provided nearly half 
of the total aid during 1945-53.  The GARIOA program was followed by the 
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) program,  which emphasized 
capital development and restrictive economic policies. Although there were 
often donor-recipient conflicts over the primary role for foreign aid, pressing 
demands from the U.S. for economic (especially price) stabilization led to a 
significant reduction in the money supply before the outbreak of the Korean 
War. 
The war reshuffled the entire recovery program, with more emphasis on 
relief than development. The Civil Relief in Korea (CRIK) program, mainly 
financed  by  the  U.S.,  provided  almost  all  assistance  during  1952-53, 
followed by  the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) 
which was multinationally based. These programs financed nearly 70 percent 
of total imports during 1951-53  as commercial export earnings for imports 
were almost negligible. 
Since the export performance was so poor, imports were constrained with 
trade  regulations.  Indeed,  USAMGIK  had  initiated  strong  foreign  trade 
regulations  that  restricted  exports  and  imports  only  to  licensed  traders. 
Exports were linked to imports by a barter trading system, and imports faced 
a  10 percent  across-the-board tariff.  Also,  quantitative  restrictions  were 
pervasive, and the overvalued exchange system was maintained. 
Table 2.4  Economic Assistance to Korea, 194553 (in millions of  U.S. dollars) 
GARIOA  ECA  CRIK  UNKRA  Total 
~~~~  ~  ~~  ~~  ~~ 
1945  4.9  4.9 
1946  49.9  49.9 
I947  175.4  175.4 
1948  179.6  179.6 
1949  92.7  23.8  116.5 
1950  49.3  9.4  58.7 
1951  32.0  74.4  0.  I  106.5 
I952  3.8  155.2  2.0  161.0 
I953  0.2  158.8  29.6  188.4 
Total  502.5  109.1  397.8  31.7  1,040.9 
Source:  BOK, Economic Statistics Yearbook. various years. 164  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
The overvaluation  of  Korean currency  had  been  the  focus of  conflicts 
between  the U.S. and  Korea. Currency overvaluation  discouraged  exports 
and, as exports could not match import demand, excess demand for foreign 
exchange produced a black market  in  which rates were substantially  higher 
than the official ones. Because foreign exchange earnings from sales to U.S. 
and  UN  forces  were  substantial,  the  Korean  government  intended  to 
overvalue its currency to gain more foreign exchange for a given amount of 
won. The same intent was apparent in the giving of  a large won  “advance” 
to the UN Command, the repayment of which in U.S. dollars would occur in 
due time. Thus, the Korean government was more concerned with obtaining 
foreign  exchange through  won  sales  to  the  U.S.  and  the  UN  than  with 
promoting  exports,  because  of  the  belief  that  devaluation  would  be 
ineffective in improving the balance.  It was thought that the barter system, 
with some export incentives, tariffs, and strict quantity restriction on imports 
could effectively reduce the trade deficit. These trade and payment regimes 
prevailed  for the rest of  the  1950s without major changes. 
2.2.3  War-related  Inflation 
Very  high  inflation  rates  first  appeared  as  strict  price  controls  were 
removed  after  the  liberation.  The  price  index  jumped  twenty-five-fold 
between  July  and  August  of  1945,  although  the  issue  of  notes  stayed 
moderate  during  the  period.  Rapid  inflation continued  in  1946 with  a 366 
percent increase in prices.  However,  inflation rates declined  steadily during 
1947-49,  as economic stabilization measures were implemented. 
Monetary expansion during the Korean War gave a second momentum for 
hyperinflation.  Prices  shot up drastically  after the outbreak of  the  war and 
surged  again  in  the  next  year  with  an  expansion  in  government military 
expenditure.  In 195  1 the annual inflation rate reached 530 percent.  However, 
as table 2.5 shows, inflation had been reduced to 30 percent by  1953. 
During  1945-53  inflation rates were high compared with those during the 
colonial period, reflecting the expansionary  effects of banks’  lending to the 
government  for economic recovery  and war financing.  Also important was 
the  role  of  aid  goods and  foreign  monies  such as U.S. dollars and  U.S. 
military payment certificates (MPCs) that were circulated  in the unorganized 
financial  markets  in  exchange  for  goods.  The  hyperinflationary  process 
invoked a flight from money into goods, which in turn brought about a flow 
of  commodities  and  foreign  monies  through  the  unorganized  financial 
markets.  While  a  detailed  analysis  of  this  early  inflationary  episode  is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, it does seem that the provision of  massive 
aid immediately after the war helped to arrest the hyperinflationary  bias. 
2.2.4  Educational Expansion and Land Reform 
Two institutional changes, educational  expansion and land  reform, seem 
to have been critical for the subsequent  success of export-led development. 
Both changes were motivated by  egalitarianism. 165  KoreafChapter 2 
lsble 2.5  Money Supply and Inllation,  194653 
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Source:  BOK, Annual Economic Review.  1947. 1955,  and Bloomfield and Jenson (1951). 
‘The  amount  of  bank  notes  issued  in  old  won  denomination  is  converted  into  the  presently  used  won 
denomination. 
bMonthly average. 
‘Average index for June 1950. 
dAverage index for April-December  in F’usan. 
The high aspirations for educational attainment  typical of  Koreans  stems 
from their  cultural  traditions.  The Japanese  had  established  facilities  for 
primary  education, however,  these  were  used  to “Japanize”  the Koreans. 
All instruction was in Japanese prior to 1945. Furthermore, the opportunities 
for higher education were extremely limited. The liberation opened the way 
to the higher education  that  was a prerequisite  for social advancement. An 
extensive public education  system (with instruction  in Korean) was initiated 
during  the  USAMGIK period.  The initial  focus on elementary levels  was 
followed by a rapid expansion of the school population  in higher education. 
Another social program that modernized  Korea on a egalitarian basis was 
land reform. The measure was first implemented  by  USAMGIK in  1947 by 
distributing farmland  previously  owned by the Japanese to the tenants.  The 
new Korean government continued the process in  1949, so that most of the 
land  had  either been  redistributed  or sold  privately  by  landlords  who  had 
anticipated the redistribution.  As a result, the number of farmers owning all 
the land they farmed increased  dramatically,  and the number of tenants fell 
from 48.9  percent  of  the total  in  1945 to just 5-7  percent  by  1952. The 
reform effectively reduced the concentration of land ownership, and it led to 
further-reaching  social  consequences:  it  ushered  in  the  decline  of  the 166  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am  Park 
landlord class which had formed the backbone of  the traditional society for 
centuries. 
In sum, the two institutional changes put Korea in a far better position to 
achieve growth with relative equity than many other developing countries. 
Equity and income distribution are discussed further in chapter 12. 
2.3  The Postwar Reconstruction Period, 1954-62 
When the Korean War ended with the armistice in 1953, all efforts were 
made to reconstruct the infrastructure and industrial facilities of Korea. The 
government endeavored to curb inflationary pressures, viewing inflation as a 
stumbling block  to  the  effective implementation of  monetary,  fiscal,  and 
trade  policies.  However,  continuing  hostility  between  North  and  South 
Korea necessitated big  military  spending that  otherwise would  have  been 
used for reconstruction and stabilization. Thus, reconstruction, stabilization, 
and strong defense were the main tasks of the government after the war. No 
doubt the government was  also concerned about  economic growth,  but  it 
remained of  secondary importance. 
2.3.1 
With the aid of  the reconstruction and stabilization programs of  the aid 
agencies, the economy grew at 4.1  percent during the period from 1953-55 
to  1960-62,  and the industrial sector grew over  10 percent per year (table 
2.6), with its share of  GNP increasing from 13.6 to 18 percent. 
Slow Economic Growth with Import Substitution 
Table 2.6  Economic Growth, 1953-62 (in percentages) 
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(Commodity 
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Source:  BOK, National Income in Korea, 1975. 
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Industry  grew  at  a  much  faster  rate  than  agriculture because  industry 
began from such a low base after the devastation of the war. Still, the major 
source of  industrial  growth  in  the  1950s was  the government’s policy  of 
import substitution. A study by  Frank, Kim, and Westphal (1975) showed 
that  the  direct  contribution  of  import  substitution  to  the  growth  of  the 
manufacturing sector was far greater than that of export expansion and that 
the shares of exports and imports in GDP were appreciably below Chenery’s 
estimates  of  the  structural  “norm”  of  countries  at  similar  stages  of 
development and capital flows (Chenery, Robinson, and Syrquin 1986). 
2.3.2  Aid, Trade, and Payments 
Foreign aid and the trade and payments regimes were highly interdepen- 
dent. As the value of  commodity imports in current U.S.  dollars was more 
than eleven times the value of exports on average from 1953 to 1962, foreign 
aid  financed commodity imports.  The major sources of  foreign exchange 
were  aid and the local currency expenditures of the UN forces. When aid 
imports were sold in the domestic market, the sales receipts were deposited 
in  “counterpart funds.” The Korean government could then use those funds 
only  for purposes mutually  agreed  upon  with  the  American government. 
Therefore, the impact of aid on Korean economic policies, either through the 
commodity imports or the counterpart funds, was tremendous because the 
inflow of  commodity imports was  crucial to economic reconstruction and 
price stabilization and because the government deficit was largely financed 
by  counterpart funds. 
In this situation conflicts were bound to arise between the aid donor and 
recipient about the objectives of  aid flows. The frictions centered on whether 
the primary objective was aid to finance economic reconstruction or to attain 
self-sufficiency. 
Table 2.7 quantifies the significance of foreign assistance. Unfortunately, 
the foreign aid figures do not coincide according to sources and coverage of 
foreign aid. In addition to data problems, the overvaluation of the won leads 
to an underestimation of aid and imports as a fraction of GNP. Aid, however, 
seems to constitute over 70 percent of imports during 1953-60. 
The  trade  and  payments  regime  continued  to  consist  of  the  exchange 
controls and import licensing that had begun in 1949, however, the impact of 
multiple exchange rates, tariffs, and quantitative controls intensified. 
Some partial steps toward export promotion policies were undertaken in 
1954 and 1955. The government introduced an export-import linkage system 
which stipulated that some essential materials could be  imported only with 
the foreign exchange earned through exports. Special exchange rates were 
applied to specific commodity exports whereby the exchange rates were set 
at 10 to 50 percent above the legal rate to compensate for the loss of profit in 
export production. In addition, the exporters of particular commodities who 
were losing international competitiveness due to high  domestic production 168  Susan M. Collins and Won-Am Park 
Table 2.7  Foreign Aid,  195340 (in millions of  U.S.  dollars) 
1953  1954  1955  1956  1957  1958  1959  1960 





Aid as a percen- 
tage of Imports 
Imports as a 
percentage of  GNP 
(current prices) 
12.8  108.4  205.8  271.0  368.8  313.6  219.7  245.2 
29.6  21.3  22.2  22.4  14.1  1.7  2.5  0.2 
201.2  179.9  236.7  293.7  382.9  321.3  222.2  245.4 
345.4  243.3  341.4  386.1  442.1  378.2  303.8  343.5 
-  -  -  158.8  50.2  8.7  0.3  - 
-__--__--  - 
58.3  73.9  69.3  76.1  86.6  84.9  73.1  71.4 
12.9  7.3  9.8  13.1  12.0  10.7  10.1  12.6 
Source:  BOK, Economic Srarisrrcs  Yearbook.  1960. 1974, and IMF. lnrernarional financial Sraristics. May 
1976. 
Nore:  Imports  as  a  percentage  of GNP  are  calculated  including  imports  of  both  goods  and  services. 
Dashes indicate that data were not  available. 
costs were  authorized  to  import  high  profit  commodities  such  as  sugar, 
newspaper,  and  wool  yam.  Finally,  some direct  subsidies  were  given  to 
exporters of commodities that were experiencing international price declines. 
However,  these  export  promotion  policies  were  relatively  ineffective 
because they were insufficient  to compensate for the growing overvaluation 
of the won. Industrial products remained uncompetitive,  and there seems to 
have  been  little  increase  in  incentives  to produce  manufactured  goods for 
export. Exports were mainly primary commodities such as mineral ores and 
agricultural and fishery products.  The trade balance fluctuated with changes 
in  foreign  aid  and  grain  harvests.  Still, it  is  important to note  that  most 
manufacturing  sectors had recovered  beyond  the prewar level by  1956 and 
the structure of exports had begun to shift toward light manufacturing. 
The import structure changed  more visibly.  Although  the import volume 
fluctuated widely according to the foreign aid amount, the portion of  imports 
such as food, crude materials, and chemicals rose, while the share of  mineral 
fuels and manufactured  goods declined. This indicates clearly the direction 
of  import substitution in the 1950s. 
Table 2.7 shows that foreign aid peaked in 1957. The decline in aid flows 
(which had been preannounced)  brought about a number of policy changes. 
In particular, the reduced aid set the stage for shifts toward export promotion 
and toward  reliance on foreign  borrowing  and domestic savings to finance 
investment  and growth. These issues  are discussed  in  detail  in subsequent 
chapters. 
2.3.3  Chronic Inflation 
The  inflation  stemming  from  the  high  rate  of  monetary  expansion 
maintained  its  fast  pace  throughout  the  postwar period.  During  1953-62 169  KoredChapter 2 
annual  inflation  averaged  around  17-20  percent  (table  2.8).  However, 
inflation  rates  varied  from period  to period, mainly a result  of fluctuating 
food prices. 
In  the  face  of  the  chronically  high  inflation,  pressure  for  a  financial 
stabilization  program  came  from  U.S.  aid  officials  in  the  process  of 
negotiating  with  the  Korean  government  about  the  level  of  aid  and  its 
objectives.  Beginning in the second half of  1957, the restrictive program set 
quarterly  ceilings  for  monetary  expansion  and  enforced  strict  budgetary 
reduction. Consequently, inflation declined to very low rates of 2-4  percent, 
although decreases in food prices resulting from bumper crops in  1957 and 
1958 also helped.  The declining  inflation during the implementation  of  the 
program was accompanied by an economic slowdown (see table 2.6),  similar 
to the stabilization experiences of other developing countries. The austerity 
measures  together  with  the declining  aid  flows also explain  the decline  in 
import volumes (see table 2.7). 
2.4  The Korean Economy in 1960: An Overview 
We  end  this  chapter by  summarizing Korea’s  economic position  at  the 
beginning  of  the  1960s, on  the  eve of  the  industrial  transformation  and 
impressive growth.  The trade regime was characterized  by  import substitu- 
tion,  including the familiar complex set of multiple exchange rates,  import 
licensing,  and overvaluation. The economy was  heavily  reliant  on foreign 
aid,  with  exports accounting  for  only  3  percent  of  output,  while  imports 
amounted  to  over  10  percent.  While  inflation  had  been  brought  under 
control,  output  growth  rates  were  stagnant.  Furthermore,  manufacturing 
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accounted  for just  11  percent  of  GNP,  with  over  45  percent  of  output 
concentrated  in  the  primary  sector.  The  next  chapters  examine  Korea’s 
transformation into a rapidly growing economic miracle. 
3  An Overview of  Korea’s 
External Debt 
In  1962 Korea’s external debt stood at $58 million, only 2.5 percent of GNP. 
By  1982 Korea had accumulated over $37 billion in external debt, or 52.7 
percent of  GNP,  ranking  it  fourth in  the  list of  debtor countries. After an 
impressive turnaround, Korea began to reduce its external debt in 1986. This 
chapter presents and discusses a number of debt statistics. The objective is to 
identify the key trends to be examined in detail in  subsequent chapters. In 
addition to the tables in the text, we refer extensively to debt tables from the 
Data Appendix. 
3.1  Korea’s External Debt 
Table 3.1 traces the accumulation of  Korean debt from 1961 to 1986. As 
shown,  the  debt  stock  rose  steadily  until  1985,  with  an  average  annual 
increase of  $2 billion. Over 75 percent of  the increase between  1962 and 
1982 occurred during three periods of  rapid debt accumulation. From  1966 
to 1969 the debt rose from $0.35 to $1.8 billion, or from 9.6 percent to 27.2 
percent of GNP. A second jump followed the 1973 increase in oil prices. The 
debt  stock  increased  by  $4.2  billion  from  1973 to  1975,  pushing  the 
debt/GNP ratio to 40.6  percent.  As debt accumulation slowed during the 
recovery period from  1975 to  1978, the debt/GNP ratio fell back to  28.6 
percent. The third period of rapid accumulation began in 1979. Over the next 
three  years,  the  debt  stock  rose  from  $14.9 to  $37.3  billion,  while  the 
debt/GNP ratio jumped  to  52.7 percent.  During  the  subsequent recovery 
(1982-83,  the debtXNP ratio averaged 53.8 percent before falling below 
47 percent in  1986. The three periods of  accumulation will be examined in 
chapters 4 and 5. We  return to the recent debt decumulation in chapter 13. 
Table A2.1 in the Data Appendix provides a more detailed breakdown of 
external debt by  maturity  and  borrower.  It  identifies two other aspects of 
Korea’s external debt history.  It  shows that  there have  been  considerable 
shifts in the term structure of  the debt.  There have also been  shifts in the 
composition of the debt between the public sector and the bank and nonbank 
private sector. 